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The Dynamism of Organizational Practices:
The Role of Founders’ Blueprints
 
Abstract
This paper explores how founders’ blueprints impact the dynamism of organizational practices, and in particular the capability to sustain as well as change practices. We first develop a theoretical argument on the critical role of the founder’s blueprint of the firm’s employment model, which are difficult to alter and mark the firm’s future path by affecting the dynamism of organizational practices over an extended period of time. Subsequently, case studies of several organizational practices in three management consulting firms in the USA, Netherlands and UK illustrate how founders’ conceptions of the employment relationship (i.e. their employment model) affects the way competing demands of continuity and renewal are addressed. Moreover, engineering- or commitment-oriented blueprints appear to facilitate the capability to adapt, while autocratic blueprints do not.



Introduction 
One of the more enduring ideas in the management literature is that sustained competitive advantage depends on the organizational capability to synthesize the competing priorities of continuity and renewal (Feldman, 2000; Leana and Barry, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2006; Godkin, 2008). This paper examines the differences in the capability to adapt and renew organizational practices that may already have been ‘programmed’ at the infancy stage of the organization (cf. Stinchcombe, 1965). The initial logics of organizing, that founder-entrepreneurs bring to their new ventures, tend to become imprinted on the organization and subsequently mold its development (Stinchcombe, 1965; Carroll and Harrison, 1994; Barnett and Carroll, 1995). A key logic founders bring to their organizations is the employment model, the conception of employment relationships adopted by companies in their infancy (Baron, Burton and Hannan, 1996; Hannan, Baron, Hsu and Koçak, 2006); this employment model may be, for example, autocratic or participative in nature. As such, the founders’ employment model may have an impact on the capability dynamics of the firm, particularly if it operates in a competitive and market environment in which human talent and effort are critical. However, the potential impact of founders’ employment models on inertia and renewal of organizational practices has not yet been studied. In this paper, we seek to address this gap in the literature. 
In doing so, we adopt a dynamic practice perspective to highlight the forces that shape how organizational practices are performed (Bourdieu, 1990; Turner, 1994; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and von Savigny, 2001; Yanow, 2004). This perspective serves to capture the way founders’ employment models in organizations impact the subsequent evolution of practices (cf. Waldman et al., 2004; Godkin, 2008). Moreover, a dynamic practice perspective is consistent with a growing interest in the co-existence of different forces in organizations -- for example, adaptation and alignment, effectiveness and efficiency, and exploitation and exploration (e.g. March, 1991; Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004). 
The paper makes two contributions. It contributes to the literature on organizational change and inertia by arguing that the founder’s employment model matters to whether and how organizational practices develop over time. Second, this study contributes to the practice literature by exploring the founder’s impact on the evolution of practices, which in some instances may endure long after they have left the firm. These are highly relevant and timely contributions, considering the pressing need for practitioners to manage their organizations towards higher levels of adaptability and continual change (cf. Burgoyne and James, 2006).
The main purpose of this paper is to develop new theory. Therefore, the empirical data collected and presented serve predominantly to ground and illustrate several key concepts and relationships, rather than to provide conclusive evidence. This paper is organized as follows. First, we review the dynamic practice literature to provide a definition of organizational practice that incorporates the role of the practitioner (e.g. firm founder) in the ways the practice is performed and processes of continuity and renewal are instigated. Subsequently, the relationship between founders’ employment models and the dynamics of practices are explored. We describe the research method adopted and subsequently illustrate and ground our theoretical argument in qualitative data on organizational practices in three management consulting firms. The analysis serves to explore how founders’ employment models impact the subsequent evolution of organizational practices. Finally, we discuss the main implications of this study for future research and management practice.

Organizational practices and founders’ employment models
This section first outlines a dynamic view on organizational practices. Subsequently, the potential impact of the founders’ blueprint of employment relations on these practices is explored.

Dynamic view on organizational practices 
A large body of literature suggests that a key challenge for any firm is to sustain and adapt its existing operations and practices (cf. exploitation), and at the same time engage in major changes (cf. exploration), for example in response to new market needs (e.g. March, 1991; Boyer and Robert, 2006; Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004). In view of the competing priorities of continuity and renewal, we adopt a dynamic view of practice that goes beyond conventional conceptualizations of organizational practices as a mode of socialization and institutionalization (Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984). In this respect, Practice-Based Studies (PBS) focus on the situated nature of action as embedded in performing practices, that is, enacted by actors and manifested in the context of language, the physical environment, and the interactions between actors (e.g. Gherardi, 2000; Jarratt and Stiles, 2010; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Whittington, 2006). A practice is the basis for coordinated collective activities which provide coherence and standardization. The dominant orientation of PBS is on replication. In this respect, PBS serve to understand how continuity of practices is reached, due to the socialization process that defines how one performs one’s practice in accordance to the specified and negotiated ‘rules’ (cf. Leana and Barry, 2000; Buchanon et al., 2005). 
However, continuity of practices can lead to a bias towards the status quo (cf. Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Greve, 1998; Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002; Hannan, Pólos and Carroll, 2004; Boyer and Robert, 2006) or becoming locked into excessive exploitation (Liu, 2006; Jansen et al., 2009). Such excessive exploitation may result in a competency trap, fostering inertia and thereby reducing the firm’s capacity to adequately respond to future environmental changes and new opportunities (Liu, 2006; Jansen et al., 2009). In particular, inertia refers to a failure to pay attention to signals, and/or an absence of appropriate activity over time (Buchanon et al., 2005). In this respect, a persistent resistance to renewal may exist, even where it is inappropriate (Hannan et al., 2004). 
A dynamic view of organizational practices is mindful of processes of replication, but is also concerned with the ways in which an ongoing practice provides a basis for re-evaluating and renewing this practice (cf. Antonacopoulou, 2007; 2008). Renewal itself is also fraught with potential difficulties in that firms may find it difficult to break away from the continuous effort to re-evaluate and re-invent practices, also referred to as excessive exploration (March, 1991; Liu, 2006). This difficulty, in turn, may result in a failure trap, which involves becoming oversensitive to short-term search and errors. Moreover, it reduces the speed at which existing competencies are improved and refined, drives out efficiencies, and prevents economies of scale (March, 1991; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Liu, 2006). 

Dissecting organizational practice
A dynamic practice perspective implies a shift in focus towards practitioners creating, maintaining and re-creating their practices. The choices practitioners make and the actions they take are a significant factor affecting practices’ continuity and renewal. In this respect, a focus on ‘practising’ accounts for the micro-dynamics of action: the tensions practitioners experience in performing a practice (Antonacopoulou, 2007). What underlies practising (i.e. the values, beliefs and interpretations) is just as critical as understanding the behaviors, activities and actions that constitute a practice. 
The dynamic perspective adopted here places organizational practices firmly in their social and historical context (Bourdieu, 1990; Schatzki, 1996). This means that practices as collective patterns of actions, activities and modes of knowing have evolved historically, and are governed by a purpose, certain rules, and formal and informal routines (Wenger, 1998; Gherardi, 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2004). In sum, an organizational practice is defined here as the performance of a set of related activities by practitioners in an organization that: (a) involve some level of collective coordination providing coherence in these activities; (b) are characterized by replication and continuity as well as exploration and renewal; and (c) are embedded in a historical and social context. This conceptualization serves to examine the specifics of a practice. In this paper, we examine the impact of practitioners’ choices in relation to the employment relationships fostered.

Founders’ employment models and organizational practices
Differences in founders’ employment models in organizations may influence the dynamics of practices. The employment model(s) adopted by the founder becomes imprinted on the newly created firm and molds their subsequent development, underscoring the importance of logics of organizing that firm founders bring to new organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965; Carroll and Harrison, 1994; Barnett and Carroll, 1995; Baron et al., 1999). Thus, differences in how administrative structures evolve may be ‘programmed’ in an organization’s infancy (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
In this respect, this study builds on work by Baron et al. (1999) and Hannan et al. (2006). Baron et al. (1999) proposed five basic types of employment relationships between founders and their employees (i.e. autocracy, bureaucracy, commitment, engineering, star), along three dimensions (employee attachment, selection of employees, basis of coordination and control) (see Table 1). The employment models initiated by founders in their fledgling firms impact many aspects of organizational behavior and firm outcomes, affecting firm evolution over time. For example, while firms with an autocratic employment model are often able to economize on administration by relying on information technology, budgeting, rules, and so forth, such economies are not costless. When founders exclusively use formal means of coordination and control, employees are less likely to develop the capability to self-manage. At the other extreme, commitment-oriented firms will tend to develop the least bureaucratic overhead. In this case, founders may economize on formal control by providing long-term employment prospects, relying on peer pressure, encouraging employees to internalize organizational goals and values, and investing in employees’ development. Thus, firms with an autocratic-model subsequently become more administratively intense than otherwise similar companies, particularly those drawing on commitment-models (Baron et al., 1999). As such, Baron et al. (1999) proposed that employment models lock in the adoption of particular structures and premises that guide decision-making, which impacts the intensity of administration. 
=== INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ===
Hannan et al. (2006) empirically tested the impact on different aspects of firm performance of, first, altering the blueprint of the employment relationship initially imposed by the founder, and second, replacing the founder with an external (outsider) CEO. Hannan et al. (2006) argued that both types of change are destabilizing to firms. Changes in the founder’s blueprint of the employment relationship are deeply embedded in the organization’s identity, which draws on a firm’s core features (e.g. the firm’s mission, form of authority, core technology and employee skills, or marketing strategy). Such changes may therefore, be viewed as “violations of deep-seated, taken-for-granted expectations by key organizational constituents” (Hannan et al., 2006: 755). Moreover, changing the (founder’s) blueprint of the employment relationship apparently decreased the firm’s growth in market value, whereas appointing an outside CEO even further decreased the rate of growth (Hannan et al., 2006).
From these empirical findings on founders’ employment models we infer the following ideas. First, a higher degree of continuity (and possibly inertia) can be expected in firms where founders draw on autocracy-models, as these firms involve a high intensity of administration. Moreover, one would expect a higher degree of renewal (possibly adrift) in firms where founders implanted commitment-models, because of a low intensity of administration. More specifically, firms with autocratic blueprints of the employment relationship are more likely to lock in (and thus inhibit renewal of) practices than commitment-model firms (cf. Baron et al., 1999). The work of Hannan et al. (2006) also suggests founders’ blueprints of the employment relationship are difficult to alter, and therefore are likely to have a strong and stable impact on the subsequent evolution of organizational practices. As such, one would expect that autocracy-model firms involve practices that remain largely unchanged over an extended period of time, whereas commitment-model firms are more likely to effectively engage in both continuity and change. 

Method
The study reported in this paper explores how founders’ blueprints of employment relationships affect continuity and renewal in organizational practices. As such, this study seeks to build new theory (cf. Strauss, 1987; Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Dul and Hak, 2008) on the relationship between founders’ employment models and the dynamics of organizational practices, as this relationship has not been previously explored. In this respect, we draw on a small number of case studies to ground the theoretical argument developed earlier in empirical observations. 
The cases were selected within a single industry, to decrease variety arising from the industrial context. We selected the management consultancy industry as the research setting, because human resources and talent (management) are critical to the performance of management consulting firms. Hence, the employment relationship is likely to be a pivotal dimension of any management consulting firm (cf. Hicks, Nair and Wilderom, 2009). The following criteria guided the selection of cases:
-	Founding year: the firm should have a substantial history since it was established, but not be older than about 25 years; this serves to collect and triangulate data from several sources (e.g. interviews with key participants in all stages of the firm’s development, as well as reports, meeting minutes, and so forth) and therefore reduces the potential bias arising from the data analysis. The three firms selected for this study were established in 1980, 1990 and 1995.
-	Small size: the firm selected should be small in size (to reduce differences arising from varieties in size), but also large enough to allow for an employment relationship to arise; thus, a small consulting boutique with one or two partners that does not employ any other staff will not be selected. When data collection started, the firms we selected employed 5, 14 and 25 people.
-	Ownership/compensation: the selected firms must have a highly similar ownership structure and compensation approach, to reduce the influence of this particular condition. In each of the three cases selected, a small number of partners own the firm, and compensation throughout the firm is based on seniority and individual performance. 
-	Expertise and client services: the services offered to clients, and thus the expertise base, need to be similar. As a result, the three firms selected provide consulting services in human resource management and organizational development. As such, leaders (incl. founders) of these firms shared a certain awareness of the importance of employment relationship -- which reduces the variety that may arise from this dimension. 
-	Meaningful variation: in order to allow for theoretically meaningful variation in founders’ employment models (cf. Yin, 2003), we searched for interesting cases in three different countries (USA, UK, and Netherlands). A cross-country study in itself does not guarantee substantial variation in the employment relationship, so we deliberately tried to identify cases that would provide variety in terms of the founder’s employment blueprint (e.g. autocracy versus commitment-based) and the current leadership situation (e.g. founder still present versus having left the firm).
This resulted in three cases: ConsulUSA, ConsulUK, and ConsulNL.
In each firm, two organizational practices were studied in-depth: business development and acquisition (BDA) and staff induction (SI). For management consulting firms, the BDA and SI practices are both critical in building and sustaining a viable business in a highly competitive industry (Groysberg and Lee, 2009). BDA involves developing business opportunities and acquiring new client assignments, which are critical to grow or sustain any consulting firm. The data collected on the BDA practices in management consultancy firms thus serve to understand how a critical work process is managed, coordinated and controlled. SI involves the way new staff members are introduced and socialized into the firm. SI is a critical practice for most organizations, but more so for consultancy firms whose success largely depends on how well new human resources are integrated into the organization (Graubner and Richter, 2003; Teece, 2003; Richter et al., 2008). 
The informants selected for each case study included the founders, managers, and other staff members involved in one or both of the practices under study. To mitigate the effects of retrospection bias, we also interviewed former members of each firm and studied key documents obtained from the firms’ archives. For example, in one of the cases the founder left the firm after a dispute with his partner; thus we also extensively interviewed the founder (as a former key participant in this firm). We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with these informants. We applied snowball sampling by asking interviewees for other informants, following up upon stories and individuals mentioned in the interviews. The data that resulted from prior interviews were verified with additional informants as well as by way of key documents, in order to triangulate their stories (cf. Jick, 1979). Moreover, several follow-up interviews were conducted to clarify a number of issues that remained ambiguous in the data analysis. In addition, email conversations were conducted with original informants to clarify remaining issues and questions. The follow-up interviews, together with frequent email conversations, also served to mitigate the bias of retrospection (cf. Leonard-Barton, 1990). A total of four informants were interviewed for the ConsulUSA case; eight informants for ConsulNL; and 21 informants in ConsulUK.

Three cases
ConsulUSA 
Two years after ConsulUSA was established (in 1980), its founder hired a new PhD with complementary skills, who later became the second partner. Until today, the two partners have been running the firm. Over the years, ConsulUSA acquired an international reputation in its HRM-related area of expertise. The founder and his partner selected and recruited new staff members, searching exclusively for those who could immediately and effectively become competent at work tasks, which reduced the need for formal routines and processes for socializing new firm members. Moreover, he sought to attach employees to ConsulUSA by fair (money-based) compensation packages. The more interesting work providing considerable levels of discretion was performed exclusively by the partners. In addition, the partners maintained control of all decisions, and coordinated and controlled work largely through direct supervision. In this respect, the founder’s blueprint closely fits that of the autocratic model described by Baron et al. (1999).
Throughout the firm’s history over three decades, the business development and acquisition (BDA) practice was characterized by a high level of continuity. For example, early on the partners decided to limit the ConsulUSA's services to four to five types in which they believed they would perform better than their competitors:
“We rarely introduce a new service because every employee has his or her own specialization and preferences among the established five services. For example, I prefer test development, but our inductees often prefer organizational effectiveness assignments.”
Over the years, there also have been few changes in the ways the partners acquired new business. In this respect, an informal ‘hands-on’ approach to acquisition prevailed.
Regarding staff induction (SI), new staff was only recruited after an employee left. The two partners preferred not to increase staff numbers, and therefore acquired as much work as they could handle with existing staff capacity. Newcomers learned their jobs by reading prior client reports in order to develop an understanding of ConsulUSA's way of working. These reports included detailed lists of the tasks comprising the jobs being examined. In the first few weeks on the job, a new employee began by developing these task lists. In order to do so, (s)he would accompany the partners to client meetings, conduct interviews with job incumbents, and observe their work on the job. When the inductee completed a list of tasks for their assigned project, the partners then compared this list to ones on file for similar jobs, to make certain it was clear and complete, requesting detailed revisions if it was not. As the founder argued: 
“Inductees are able to fully learn about the job they are examining by means of developing a list of tasks. This approach ensures that they have a strong understanding of what is really done on the job. An accurate task list enables us to provide virtually any service the client requests, even many years later. Therefore, we are careful to conduct a detailed validation of the task list.”
The partners evaluated inductees as self-sufficient if they could do a validation study from beginning to end and write the final report, so that they only had to look it over and give a few comments. The partners recalled they expected at some point to move their employees into proposal writing for clients. Throughout the firm’s history, however, this virtually never happened: 
“It takes a while to get a new person up to speed, and I’m still having to edit the work of the employees we have at the moment.”
In fact, the partners never made a sustained effort to develop and train employees to take on business development tasks -- although they consciously raised these expectations when recruiting and hiring new staff. As such, the partners ultimately needed to re-staff each time skilled and capable employees left due to unmet needs.
Overall, this case illustrates how an autocratic blueprint can strongly affect organizational practices. The BDA and SI practices remained unchanged over a period of almost 30 years. The founder’s blueprint implied that employee attachment through interpersonal closeness or particular opportunity structures for employees was not cultivated; moreover, the emphasis on direct control and supervision appeared to highly restrict opportunities for employees to grow and develop. As a result, time and again capable employees left the firm due to unmet needs. The autocratic blueprint of ConsulUSA therefore appears to have created a strong continuity (and possibly inertia) in its organizational practices.

ConsulNL  
ConsulNL was established in 1995 by a seasoned management consultant. In the first few years, he took two new partners on board, who together with the founder formed the first generation of ConsulNL’s leadership. The founder's vision on management (consulting) implied the partners and senior consultants collaboratively coordinated and controlled key processes (i.e. control is peer/cultural in nature). Moreover, the founder installed an employee selection approach in which job candidates were primarily assessed on their ability to contribute to project work for clients as well as the fit of their personalities with ConsulNL's open culture and process-oriented approach (i.e. 'skills' and 'fit' were key factors in selecting employees). In addition, by offering highly interesting and challenging work, newcomers were committed to the firm (i.e. 'work' most prominent in attaching employees). For example, new hires -- even very junior ones -- were immediately immersed in work for and with clients. The founder’s employment blueprint thus closely matches both the engineering and commitment models described by Baron et al. (1999).
In 1999, the founder suddenly left after a dispute with the other two partners; this dispute arose from increasingly divergent views on ConsulNL’s approach to management consulting - and not so much about the founder’s employment blueprint. Subsequently, the two remaining partners gradually built a new leadership team. This process was completed with the retirement of the two partners, who left the firm to a new generation of three partners (who all worked at ConsulNL as junior and senior consultants for many years).  At the time of collecting data for this study, the new partnership team had been running ConsulNL for more than 5 years and was clearly struggling with some dimensions of the founder’s blueprint of their firm. 
Both the former and current partnership team engaged in efforts to develop and renew the firm’s BDA and SI practices, which were perceived as inadequate in several respects (e.g. because not enough new client projects were acquired). With regard to the BDA practice, many changes were tried out, while being largely ignorant with respect to what courses of action would work: for example, new services were developed and tried out, the commercial skills of staff members were deepened by organizing so-called summer schools, and a specialist in acquisition was hired. A striking example is a new service concept that had been under development for almost 15 years, but without any success. Nevertheless, even the current team of partners continued to invest in it because “we think it is still fun to develop it” (according to one of the partners). Overall, the many efforts to boost BDA capacity were not successful; only a very small number of new clients were actually acquired as a result. The BDA practice thus appeared to have gone adrift. 
By contrast, the SI practice within ConsulNL was transformed gradually over time. Since the firm’s start, newcomers (junior consultants) were immediately immersed in projects for major clients. As such, they developed their personal style and approach by figuring out what worked and what did not. Each newcomer was mentored in this process by a partner or senior consultant. The diversity of role models within ConsulNL would motivate new hires to learn different ways of approaching their work. Consequently, partners and senior consultants were fully aware of the need to expose junior consultants to different mentors:
“At a certain moment in time I tell them ‘you need someone else for your further development’. Why? Because you need to learn new skills, because you look too much like me.” (senior consultant)
In the first nine years, ConsulNL largely focused on attracting new hires directly from university, and discovered that their lack of experience was problematic within its employment model (i.e. demanding from new hires that they can contribute to client projects immediately). Subsequently, the new team of partners switched to hiring more senior people (45 or older), but without any success since these more mature professionals had their own established way of doing things, which did not align well with the particular consulting approach developed at ConsulNL. As such, the partners started hiring ‘mediors’ (i.e. with 2 to 4 years of consulting experience), which resulted in several new hires that were successfully integrated into the firm:
“There were disputes over what is the ‘right’ inductee. Previously, partners just hired young people, now they are looking for talent. Every partner, with no exceptions, needs to be convinced that the job candidate has the talent they are looking for, otherwise he will not be hired.” (senior consultant)
Overall, this case illustrates how an engineering-commitment blueprint serves to change organizational practices effectively (e.g. compared to the previous case). As such, ConsulNL’s performance in successfully changing organizational practices is mixed: the efforts to renew its BDA practice went adrift, whereas the SI practice was gradually adapted over time. In this respect, the current leadership of ConsulNL may have uncritically embraced and sustained the employment model of its predecessors, although the attachment and selection dimensions of the employment relationship may need repositioning  -- for example, towards either a fully fledged commitment or engineering model. 

ConsulUK 
ConsulUK was established in 1990 when the HR consulting unit of a major professional service provider, by means of a management buy-out, became an independent company. The founder played a significant role in the management buyout (also acquiring 50% of the equity in the new firm). The founder-CEO and four directors, together constituting the board of ConsulUK, owned and managed the firm. In addition, ConsulUK employed 16 management consultants when it was established. 
ConsulUK operated in the area of human resources, with a particular focus on change management. The founder at the time installed a recruitment and selection approach implying that, once employees joined the firm, they were expected to perform consulting tasks immediately and effectively (i.e. skills are key in selecting employees). Moreover, although the board was the final decision-making authority, all employees engaged in controlling and coordinating organizational practices (i.e. these are peer/cultural in nature). In addition to offering highly interesting work, the founder’s vision and leadership style was a major factor that inspired and emotionally bonded employees to the firm (i.e. in terms of Table 1, employees are attached to the firm by ‘work’ as well as ‘love’). For example, the founder/CEO personally welcomed each new recruit, and extensively introduced him/her into the history of the firm, its current focus, and future aspirations. A consultant reflected as follows:
“The founder is the history of the firm (...) He owns 50% of the firm and he is the one who founded it, so you would want as an individual and new employee to listen to the firm founder telling it, and he tells the story very well.”
Thus, the founder’s blueprint strongly resembles a combined engineering and commitment model.
This blueprint appeared to facilitate how the BDA practice developed and changed over time. The BDA approach that was established early on was straightforward: once a potential client showed interest in engaging with the firm, one of the consultants was in charge of writing the proposal, which was internally discussed and subsequently presented to the potential client. This process implied that clients received personalized service, but also reflected the absence of a standardized procedure on BDA.
Initially, ConsulUK mainly acquired projects from the private sector, and later also observed opportunities in the public sector. Targeting public sector organizations as potential clients implied that ConsulUK needed to adapt its BDA practice. Particularly proposal writing became more important over time, in view of the formal procedures in the public sector which demanded writing high quality proposals. About ten years after the firm was established, proposal writing and bidding (‘pitching’) therefore became the formal procedures adopted for developing new business. 
Some internal forces were also changing the ways in which BDA activities were performed. At the core of these changes was the shift in management. Up until 2005, the founder/CEO shaped the character of BDA as he was the key player involved in generating new business; he used his extensive network in the industry to get the company known and to attract new clients. However, with the CEO’s forthcoming retirement, many consultants were becoming more directly involved in BDA. This change was linked to the founder/CEO himself. In the last few years before his retirement, he deliberately prepared the organization for his departure and therefore gradually withdrew from the day-to-day activities of the firm. Key individuals were recruited to take over BDA activities from him. A consultant reflected: 
“The firm founder is reaching a certain age and sales targets need to move, so employing people like one of the directors was the way to go for us and change direction. And we don’t use the founder at all for stuff because you know, he is not really in our space and actually he is less and less in the space of people.”
One of the directors as well as a marketing manager were driving forces in creating a longer term business view, also by bringing a sales orientation to ConsulUK. Two consultants noted:
“I think he (i.e. director) has made a huge impact on the business. (…) It’s just that he brought in that drive.”
 “Having the marketing manager here has made a big change. Having someone who is dedicated you know 24/7 for doing marketing, doing PR, thinking about our brand, our corporate identity, how we network, looking after the database regularly, and helping us with the events and seminars. All that stuff has been beneficial.”
For many fresh recruits, ConsulUK was the starting point in their career as consultants. Staff induction (SI) practices at ConsulUK were therefore developed to provide the recruits with an introduction to the organization and its culture, as well as a sense of consultancy as a profession. As such, SI was organized in a way that board members were able to influence the attitude of the newcomers, to help them become well rounded in skills, independent in thinking, and entrepreneurial in attitude. This view was echoed by both directors and consultants:
“We try to encourage people to do the whole breadth of the consulting process which is extremely difficult, and realistically, no one is good at it all.” (director)
 “Here you do everything yourself.” (consultant)
Since 2004 the SI practice evolved. Many interviewees agreed that SI became more structured, as a result of several complaints of being badly organized around that time. For example, the ultimate responsibility for SI shifted from the executive board towards a specific team leader, responsible for the inductee’s development and the main point of contact during the entire induction period (at least two years). Moreover, specific documents and check-lists were designed to provide guidance on SI. 
Overall, this case suggests that an engineering-commitment blueprint facilitates an effective interplay between change and continuity in organizational practices. Particular BDA and SI practices were transformed, while holding on to several dimensions of these practices that were established early on. The distributed control culture, deeply rooted in ConsulUK’s employment blueprint, was leveraged by the CEO to prepare the firm for his imminent departure. 

Discussion
The findings arising from the three case studies are summarized in Table 2. These cases illustrate how founders’ blueprints may affect organizational practices over an extended period of time. Many years after founding the firm, the initial blueprints of ConsulUSA, ConsulNL and ConsulUK continued to strongly impact (inertia or change in) organizational practices, in one case even long after the founder left the firm. 
In addition, the cases serve to empirically ground our earlier theoretical argument about the impact of different blueprints. In this respect, engineering- and/or commitment-based employment blueprints tend to provide more fertile ground for effectively managing change than autocratic employment models. Particularly the ConsulUK case illustrates that an engineering-commitment blueprint creates favorable conditions for developing a distributed and participative capability for organizational change. These favorable conditions arise when managers and other staff members throughout the organization are enabled and motivated to practise and exercise their practical judgment, to the benefit of exploitation and adaptation of current business activities, as well as, exploration of new opportunities. 
The mixed nature of the employment blueprint in the Dutch and British cases also raises the question whether broader and more inclusive founders’ employment models involve a more diverse set of options (cf. genetic pool) that positively affects renewal and change. The findings with regard to the Dutch case, however, can also be interpreted in the opposite direction: as such, a ‘pure’ employment model (e.g. commitment or engineering) possibly provides more favorable conditions for growing the organizational capability for change than a mixed blueprint.
A related question arising from our findings is whether differences within the engineering-commitment blueprint (cf. Table 2) can explain the distinct ways in which organizational practices at ConsulNL and ConsulUK evolved. For example, would a staff selection approach entirely focused on skills, rather than on both skills and organizational fit, make a difference to how ConsulNL’s practices evolved (compared to those of ConsulUK). These are interesting questions and hypotheses for future work.
=== INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ===
Our analysis of the three cases contributes in several ways to the literature. A key contribution arises from the theoretical idea that founders’ blueprints, particularly in the form of the employment model(s) adopted at an early stage, appear to matter as to whether and how the firm develops over time. This is a significant extension of the existing literature on organizational continuity and change, that tends to focus on antecedents at the firm, inter-firm and environmental level (e.g. Buchanon et al., 2005; Boyer and Robert, 2006; Simsek, 2009), assuming these antecedents are current in nature and have a short history (if any). Our study of management consulting firms indeed illustrates that some of these antecedents have been ‘programmed’ at the stage of infancy of the organization (cf. Stinchcombe, 1965). In this respect, the employment model adopted in the first few years of the firm’s existence serves as key logic of organizing that founders bring to their organizations. As such, the founders’ employment model may have a substantial impact on organizational practices, particularly if the firm operates in a competitive and market environment in which human talent and effort are critical.
Second, this study contributes to the practice-based literature (e.g. Gherardi and Nicolini, 2002; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Whittington, 2006) by demonstrating that founders may have a strong and stable impact on the evolution of practices, in some instances long after they have left the firm. In particular, founders’ blueprints may be difficult to alter, given their largely tacit nature and their interdependency with other structural characteristics of the firm (e.g. strategy, ownership, physical location). Therefore, these blueprints mark the firm’s future path by affecting the dynamics of practices over an extended period of time. In this respect, our findings suggest practices are more likely to remain unchanged in an autocratic than an engineering or commitment blueprint of the employment relationship, whereas founders’ blueprints that are engineering and/or commitment oriented are more likely to affect change in organizational practices (cf. Table 2). 
A core notion in the practice literature is Charles Peirce’s and John Dewey’s concept of ‘habit’ (e.g. Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks and Yanow, 2009) and Bourdieu’s (1990) ‘habitus’. Following Bourdieu, habitus is an embodiment of structure that provides people with a sense of the ‘feel for the game’, and as such also provides the grounds for agency, within a limited arena of choice. In Bourdieu’s conception, habitus unites the past and the present because, while being the product of early experience, it is subject to the transformations brought about by subsequent experiences. Our study suggests that founders’ employment models, as defined by Baron et al. (1999), provide an interesting framework for identifying the historical aspects of the current habitus prevailing in a particular firm as well as for tracking its development over time. Beyond habit, our study also makes the intimate connection between practitioners and their (organizational) practices more explicit. The legacy of the founder does not only appear to affect the nature of the practice and how it is performed, it also underpins the dynamics of the practice as it evolves over time.

Implications for practitioners
These contributions to the organizational change and practice literatures also have important implications for business practitioners. In particular, entrepreneurs, investors and other stakeholders need to be (made) fully aware of the long-term consequences of adopting a specific blueprint for running and organizing new ventures and firms. The effort and costs associated with adopting a particular blueprint in the early years of a new start-up are relatively trivial compared to those arising from the need to change the blueprint in order to make the firm more viable at a later stage (e.g. 10 or 15 years later). Building this type of awareness among (potential) entrepreneurs and new firm founders is a major responsibility for business schools and other institutes for higher and professional education.

Limitations and future research
This study was set up to develop new theory on how founders’ blueprints may impact continuity and change in organizational practices. The three cases presented previously do not provide compelling evidence for the key theoretical ideas we have developed, but merely illustrate these. 
Nonetheless, there are several limitations to this study. A first limitation arises from the organizational setting, which involved small firms in the management consultancy industry. Selecting this type of firm served to examine the role of founders’ employment models in relation to the practices under study. Generalizing our findings to larger (management consultancy) firms may therefore be problematic. In this respect, large firms tend to be more able to make long-term commitments to specialized staff and resources for renewal efforts (cf. Winter, 2003), for example by separating new product development work from operational business concerns. 
Another limitation arises from the fact that our data do not allow us to rule out all alternative (rival) explanations. The key proposition is that the founder’s employment model has a strong impact on the firm’s ability to adapt and change. The case selection criteria outlined in the Method section serve to rule out several other alternative explanations (e.g. differences in size, ownership and compensation). However, a rival explanation that cannot be effectively ruled out involves the personality and leadership style of the top managers, as another key factor driving the firm’s ability to adapt and change. Future work in this area can serve to tease out whether personality and leadership style provide a stronger or weaker driving force than, or rather complement, founders’ blueprints as conditions for adaptation and change in organizational practices. 
A third limitation may arise from conducting case studies in a single industry that is likely to produce similar employment models (cf. Baron et al., 1999). As such, future research may involve case studies in multiple industries other than management consultancy, to cover a broader set of employment blueprints (cf. Table 1).
Fourth, the clear distinction between founders’ employment models advocated by Baron et al. (1999) may not be feasible in some settings, as previously discussed. Moreover, an interesting question for future research may be whether combined (e.g. engineering-commitment) models tend to constitute conditions positively affecting organizational change and adaptability – as a result of the larger diversity in the firm’s blueprint. 
Finally, future studies in this area need to address other organizational antecedents (e.g. Jansen et al., 2006). In this respect, continuity and renewal can be triggered by actions and events in unfolding processes other than founders’ blueprints (cf. Kelly and Amburgey, 1991).

Conclusion
In this study we explored how founders’ blueprints -- that is, their initial conception of employment relationships -- may impact continuity and change in organizational practices.  Case studies of small management consulting firms illustrated how the founder's conception of employment relationships affects the way competing demands of continuity and renewal are addressed. These blueprints appear to be difficult to alter, and mark the firm’s future path by affecting the level of continuity and change in organizational practices over an extended period of time. Moreover, our study suggests that engineering- or commitment-oriented blueprints provide more fertile ground for developing vital and responsive organizations than autocratic blueprints.
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Table 1: Five employment model types (source: Baron et al., 1999)

		Dimensions	
Employment model	Attachment	Selection	Coordination/control
EngineeringStarCommitmentBureaucracyAutocracy	WorkWorkLoveWorkMoney	SkillsPotentialFitSkillsSkills	Peer/culturalProfessionalPeer/culturalFormalDirect



Table 2: Comparative findings
	ConsulUSA	ConsulNL	ConsulUK
Firm founder:	One of the two current partners	Left after a dispute; the other partner (who later retired) then gradually prepared and developed the current partnership team	Current CEO, preparing for retirement
Founder’s blueprint:	Autocracy 	Engineering-commitment	Engineering-commitment
Attachment:	Money	Work	Work & Love
Selection:	Skills	Skills & Fit	Skills
Control:	Direct supervision	Peer-cultural	Peer-cultural
BDA and SIPractices:	Over a period of almost three decades, the partners stuck to BDA and SI practices established early on. The continuity of practices thus prevailed, with emerging symptoms of inertia (cf. skilled and capable employees leaving due to unmet needs).	The second generation of partners repeatedly attempted to change the BDA and SI practices, while some core aspects of these practices remained unquestioned (cf. the unsuccessful efforts to become more market-oriented). The efforts to change the BDA practice went adrift, whereas the SI practice was gradually adapted.	The board successfully created changes in the SI and BDA practices (e.g. formal procedure for proposal writing & bidding), while sustaining and leveraging the culture of distributed control that was established early on.
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